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Abstract In	  2005	   a	  major	  multi-­‐‑national	  media	   company	   launched	   a	  New	  Zealand	   radio	  network	  that	   played	   only	   New	   Zealand	   music—Kiwi	   FM.	   Within	   a	   year	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   the	  experiment	   had	   failed,	  with	   the	   network	   attracting	   only	   negligible	   audience	   ratings	   and	  unsustainable	  commercial	  revenue.	  It	  was	  at	  this	  point	  that	  the	  New	  Zealand	  government	  stepped	   in,	   granting	   the	   network	   free	   broadcasting	   spectrum	   and	   significant	   funding	   in	  return	   for	   the	   ongoing	   promotion	   of	   New	   Zealand	  music.	   How	   this	   happened	   provides	  critical	   insights	   into	   ‘third	  way’	   approaches	   to	   the	   creative	   industries,	   and	   in	   particular,	  local	   music	   as	   a	   cultural,	   political	   and	   economic	   commodity.	   Kiwi	   FM	   raises	   questions	  about	  national	  musical	  cultures	  and	  how	  artists,	  governments	  and	  businesses	   interact	   in	  these	  contested	  spaces.	  This	  article	  explores	  Kiwi	  FM	  as	  it	  moved	  from	  being	  a	  commercial	  enterprise	   to	   a	   government	   partner	   from	   behind	   the	   scenes,	   using	   previously	   unseen	  documents	   and	   interviews	   with	   key	   players	   in	   order	   to	   interrogate	   the	   utility	   of	   ‘third	  way’	  approaches	  to	  promoting	  and	  supporting	  the	  creative	  industries.	  
 
Introduction The	   fifth	   Labour	   Government	   came	   to	   power	   in	   New	   Zealand	   in	   1999,	   with	   a	   set	   of	  popular	   policies	   focused	   on	   the	   youth,	   worker	   and	   centrist	   votes.	   These	   espoused	  economic	   growth	  while	   reigning	   in	   the	   free	  market;	   a	   return	   to	   a	   social	   consensus	  on	  welfare,	   education,	   health	   security	   and	   cultural	   liberalism;	   and	   a	   new	   focus	   on	   the	  ‘creative	   industries’	   as	   valuable	   cultural	   and	   economic	   resources	   (Aimer	   2010,	   476;	  Williams	   2000,	   23-­‐‑29;	   Volkering	   2001,	   443-­‐‑46).	   	   This	   approach	   echoed	   Tony	   Blair’s	  ‘third	  way’	  challenge	  to	  the	  conservative	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  consensus	  which	  he	   contrasted	   with	   a	   growing	   liberal	   and	   outward-­‐‑looking	   electorate	   in	   the	   United	  Kingdom	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  meme	  ‘Cool	  Britannia’.	  This	  focused	  on	  engaging	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  ‘creative	  industries’	  in	  forming	  a	  new	  base	  of	  cultural,	  social	  and	  economic	  activity	  that	  would	  create	  new	  opportunities	   for	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  its	  citizens,	  thereby	  reinvigorating	  a	  sense	  of	  national	  pride	  and	  providing	  new	  and	  tangible	  economic	   benefits	   (Volkering	   2001,	   438;	   447-­‐‑49).	   Both	   the	  United	  Kingdom	   and	  New	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Zealand	   had	   voted	   in	   governments	   that	   had	   campaigned	   on	   retreating	   from	   the	  harshness	   of	   previous	   neoliberal	   governments	   that	   had	   deregulated	   both	   national	  economies	  and	  reoriented	  their	  countries	  towards	  the	  international	  free	  market	  and	  the	  perceived	  benefits	  of	  globalisation.	  Central	  to	  the	  Labour	  campaign	  was	  its	  leader,	  Helen	  Clark,	  who	  had	  spent	  three	  years	  since	   the	   previous	   election	   defeat	   in	   1996	   building	   a	   reputation	   as	   a	   straight-­‐‑shooter	  and	  an	  honest	  player	  who	  was	   economically	   creditable	  but	   also	   a	   strong	   supporter	  of	  New	  Zealand	  arts,	  culture	  and	  heritage	  (Williams,	  2000,	  23-­‐‑29;	  McAloon,	  2010,	  38-­‐‑39).	  Clark	  also	  managed	  to	  cross	  the	  perceived	  gender-­‐‑divide	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  becoming	  the	  first	  woman	   elected	  Prime	  Minister	   and	   later	   advocating	   for	  New	  Zealand	   to	   host	   the	  Rugby	  2011	  World	  Cup	  over	  a	  successful	  four-­‐‑year	  campaign.	  	  The	   fifth	   Labour	   government	   deliberately	   set	   out	   to	   connect	   itself	   to	   the	   creative	  industries,	   recognising	   not	   just	   the	   cultural	   and	   economic	   benefits	   of	   supporting	   the	  sector,	  but	  also	  the	  electoral	  ones	  (Volkering	  2001,	  448).	  Part	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Clark	  government	  was	  its	  appeal	  to	  younger	  and	  more	  socially	  liberal	  voters	  (and,	  often,	  their	  parents)	  by	  introducing	  socially	  progressive	  change	  across	  a	  range	  of	  policy	  platforms.	  These	  included	  introducing	  interest-­‐‑free	  student	  loans,	  capping	  tertiary	  education	  fees,	  campaigning	   on	   introducing	   a	   commercial-­‐‑free	   radio	   network	   for	   young	   people,	  legalising	  prostitution,	  reforming	  antiquated	  marriage	  and	  divorce	  laws	  and	  increasing	  state	  funding	  for	  popular	  music,	  television,	  film	  and	  contemporary	  arts.	  Clark	  also	  chose	  to	   take	   the	   portfolio	   of	   Minister	   for	   Culture	   and	   Heritage,	   firmly	   cementing	   her	  reputation	  as	   fostering	  New	  Zealand	   identity	  and	  culture	   in	  an	   increasingly	  globalised	  world	   (Hayward	  2010,	  234-­‐‑35).	   Clark	  was	   an	   active	  Minister	   for	   the	  Arts	   and	  Culture	  and	   was	   seen	   as	   accessible,	   open	   and	   media-­‐‑friendly	   in	   her	   various	   roles	   (Hayward	  2010,	  235).	  	  	  





the	  Triple	   J	   network	   in	  Australia.	   There	   had	  been	   an	   often-­‐‑fractious	   public	   discussion	  between	   commercial	   radio	   and	   supporters	   of	   the	   YRN	   in	   previous	   years	   and	   no	  government	   had	   yet	   committed	   to	   launching	   the	   service,	   despite	   reserving	   radio	  frequencies	   nationwide	   for	   its	   inception	   (Innes	   2006;	   Mollgaard	   2005).	   Kiwi	   FM	  negotiated	  an	  initial	  short-­‐‑term	  (one	  year)	  licence	  to	  ‘borrow’	  these	  frequencies	  and	  was	  required	   to	  work	   towards	   becoming	   an	   independent	   not-­‐‑for-­‐‑profit	   organisation	  while	  being	  operated	  from	  CanWest	  studios	   in	  return	  for	  this	  government	  support.	  This	  was	  an	  attempt	   to	  produce	  a	  public	  broadcasting	  outcome	  using	  a	  commercial	  partnership	  with	  CanWest,	   in	  effect	  a	  Public/Private	  Partnership,	  very	  much	   in	   line	  with	   the	   ‘third	  way’	   aspirations	  of	   the	   fifth	  Labour	   government	   to	   support	   and	  monetise	   the	   creative	  economy	  of	  New	  Zealand.	  
 
The Labour government and Kiwi FM: popular music as culture and politics It	   is	   highly	   unusual	   for	   a	   government	   to	   support	   a	   private	   company	   to	   create	   a	   radio	  station	   that	   exclusively	   plays	   and	   promotes	   national	   popular	   music.	   This	   unique	  situation	   needs	   examination	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   relationships	   between	   understandings	   of	  national	  culture	  and	  the	  roles	  of	  government,	  citizens,	  creators	  and	  businesses.	  Notions	  of	   what	   constitutes	   national	   culture	   and	  what	   deserves	   attention,	   funding,	   promoting	  and	  archiving	  are	  contested	  and	  fluid.	   In	  this	  study,	  music	  radio	  is	  a	   focus	  as	  the	  radio	  station,	   the	   government	   and	   the	   people	   studied	   here	   were	   all	   part	   of	   a	   supposed	  ‘renaissance’	   in	  New	  Zealand	  music;	   one	   that	   saw	  debates	   about	   the	  national	   value	  of	  popular	  music	  culture	  become	  more	  visible.	  	  	  Defining	  ‘culture’	  is	  problematic	  in	  that,	  though	  it	  may	  seem	  easy	  to	  explain	  as	  ‘what	  we	  all	   do’,	   it	   is	   the	   underlying	   structures	   of	   history,	   economics,	   politics	   and	   meaning—making	   power—that	   dictate	   how	   we	   form	   assumptions	   about	   what	   it	   means	   to	  participate	   in	   or	   even	   recognize	   ‘what	   we	   all	   do’.	   One	   key	   approach	   was	   formed	   by	  Raymond	  Williams,	  who	  argued	  that	  ‘culture’	  was	  an	  ‘exceptionally	  complex	  term’	  which	  deserved	   careful	   examination	   and	   explication	   since	   its	   use	   could	   indicate	   power	  relationships	   alongside	   lived	  human	   truths	   in	   a	   given	   society	   and/or	  nation	   (Williams	  1981,	  10-­‐‑14).	  	  	  Williams	  observed	  a	  convergence	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century	  between	  two	  previously	  understood	  definitions	  of	  culture.	  The	  first	  was	  an	  ‘idealist’	  type	  of	  ‘informing	  spirit’	  as	  creating	  a	  ‘whole	  way	  of	  life,	  which	  is	  manifest	  over	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  social	  activities—a	  language,	   styles	   of	   art,	   kinds	   of	   intellectual	  work’	   (Williams	  1981,	   12-­‐‑13).	   The	   second	  was	  a	  ‘materialist’	  position	  of	  a	  ‘whole	  social	  order’	  that	  was	  a	  ‘direct	  or	  indirect	  product	  of	  an	  order	  primarily	  constituted	  by	  other	  social	  activities’—in	  other	  words	  constituted	  either	   deliberately	   or	   through	   reaction	   to	   other	   social	   constructions	   such	   as	   history,	  geography,	   politics	   and	   economics	   (Williams	  1981,	   13-­‐‑14).	  Williams	   also	   conceived	  of	  culture	  as	   the	   ‘ordinary’,	   arguing	   that	   two	   ‘senses’	  of	   culture	   lived	  by	  human	  beings—‘the	   most	   ordinary	   and	   common	   meanings	   and	   the	   finest	   individual	   meanings’—had	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toward	  the	  common	  good	  rather	  than	  financially	  powerful	  classes	  and	  organizations;	  as	  well	  as	   the	  protection	  of	   ‘micro-­‐‑cultures’,	  dissidence	  and	  access	   to	  cultural	  production	  beyond	  commercial	  and	  consumer	  systems	  (77-­‐‑89).	  	  The	  complexity	  of	  ‘culture’	  as	  a	  place	  of	  contestation	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  approach	  of	  this	  study,	  as	  it	  examines	  the	  intersections	  between	  the	  state,	  notions	  of	  ‘New	  Zealand-­‐‑ness’	  in	  the	  definition	  and	  valuation	  of	  New	  Zealand	  music,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  corporate	  media	  as	  creators	   and	   promoters	   of	   culture	   and	   as	   part	   of	   societal	   structures	   that	   they	   also	  perpetuate.	  Implicit	  in	  this	  is	  Williams’	  configuration	  of	  the	  ordinary	  as	  a	  particular	  way	  of	   life	   that	   influences	   how	   artists,	   government	   agencies	   and	   the	   media	   interpret	   and	  react	  to	  conceptions	  of	  New	  Zealand	  culture	  as	  both	  ordinary	  and	  particular	  as	  well	  as	  valuable	  and	  unique.	  	  
National music culture Notions	  of	  a	   ‘national’	  music	  culture	  are	  no	  less	  complicated,	  as	  they	  must	  define	  what	  constitutes	   the	   ‘national’	   as	   a	   starting	   point.	   This	   is	   especially	   complex	   in	   the	   face	   of	  globalization,	   trans-­‐‑national	   cultural	   moments	   and	   movements	   and	   the	   ongoing	  ‘shrinkage’	  of	  the	  world	  due	  to	  rapidly	  spreading	  global	  communication	  networks.	  As	  a	  result,	   the	   ‘national’	   is	   now	   almost	   defined	   more	   by	   what	   it	   is	   not,	   rather	   than	   by	   a	  geographical	  place,	  a	  set	  of	  common	  values	  and	  norms	  and	  a	  common	  culture.	  	  An	  important	  early	  critique	  of	  music	  as	  a	   ‘national’	  cultural	  artefact	  is	  seen	  in	  Theodor	  W.	  Adorno’s	  work	  on	  the	  sociology	  of	  music	  (1988).	  Adorno	  argued	  that	  examining	  not	  only	  the	  nationality	  of	  a	  composer	  or	  geographical	  roots	  of	  a	  musical	  movement,	  but	  also	  the	  instrumentation,	  compositional	  techniques,	  socio-­‐‑political	  milieu	  and	  the	  ideological	  position	  of	  a	  composer	  and	  genre	  reveal	   ‘how	  deeply	  the	  humanity	  and	  universality	  of	  music	   entwine	   with	   the	   national	   element	   they	   are	   transcending’	   (160).	   Adorno	  postulated	  a	   ‘dialectical’	  history	  of	  music—one	   that	  exalted	  music	  as	   transcending	   the	  nation,	  but	  also	  one	  that	  ‘drew	  its	  energies	  from	  national	  peculiarities	  of	  compositional	  procedure’	   (174)	   To	   this	   end,	   at	   times	   the	   ‘national	   element	   became	   a	   musical	  productive	   force’	   in	  reaction	  to	  colonialism,	  commercialism	  and	  to	   the	  standardization	  of	   music	   as	   a	   commodity	   that	   marked	   the	   anti-­‐‑intellectualism	   and	   mass	   mimicry	   of	  industrial	  production	  and	  consumption	  (163-­‐‑68).	  	  Adorno	  was	  critical	  of	  the	  nationalist	  fervour	  of	  schools	  of	  music,	  based	  in	  and	  reflective	  of	   nationalist	   chauvinisms,	   socio-­‐‑political	   turmoil	   and	   the	   industrialization	   of	   human	  endeavour	  (Adorno	  1988,	  154-­‐‑77).	  Adorno	  was	  particularly	  scathing	  about	  the	  music	  of	  Germany,	  from	  where	  he	  was	  exiled	  as	  a	  Jew	  during	  the	  Nazi	  era.	  While	  acknowledging	  a	  long	  and	  diverse	  musical	  history,	  a	  ‘genuine,	  specifically	  German	  musical	  accent’	  and	  the	  talent	   of	   German	   composers	   such	   as	   Mozart,	   Adorno	   was	   transfixed	   by	   the	   ability	   of	  composers	  such	  as	  Wagner	  to	  ‘conjure	  up	  a	  world	  and	  manipulate	  a	  half-­‐‑submerged	  and	  forgotten	  collective	  world	  of	  images’	  that	  when	  used	  in	  the	  service	  of	  Nazi	  Germany	  as	  a	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constant	  renegotiation	  of	  authenticity	  also	  reflects	  the	  reorientation	  of	  the	  nation-­‐‑state	  to	   the	  global	  economy	   insofar	  as	   the	   ‘transition	   from	  a	  bounded,	   cultural	   and	  political	  view	  of	  the	  nation-­‐‑state’	  is	  challenged	  by	  ‘supra-­‐‑national	  configurations’	  as	  globalization	  unfolds	   (35).	   National	   musical	   authenticity	   therefore	   becomes	   a	   ‘complex	   site	   of	  contestation	   involving	   civic,	   ethnic	   and	   economic	   conceptions	   of	   national	   identity’,	  transitional	   by	   nature	   and	   informed	   by	   local,	   national	   and	   global	   discourses	   and	  practices	  (35)	  	  O’Flynn	  also	  adapts	  the	  Gramscian	  concept	  of	  ‘hegemony’	  (Gramsci	  1971)	  to	  the	  nation-­‐‑state’s	   involvement	   in	   the	  support	  of	  national	  musical	   forms	  and	  outputs.	  To	   this	  end,	  civic,	   ethnic	   and	   economic	   identities	   as	   well	   as	   institutions	   and	   dominant	   social	   and	  political	   groups	   can	  be	   seen	   as	   privileging	   and	   supporting	   specific	   types	   and	   styles	   of	  national	   musical	   expression,	   with	   styles	   and	   types	   not	   part	   of	   the	   discourses	   and	  practices	  symbolically	  negated	  (O’Flynn	  2007,	  27-­‐‑29).	  In	  addition,	  according	  to	  O’Flynn,	  outside	   influences	   can	   be	   captured	   and	   implanted	   into	   the	   hegemonic	   narrative,	  with	  those	   influences	   privileged	   over	   others	   not	   supporting	   the	   dominant	   groups	   and	  practices.	  	  O’Flynn	   notes	   the	   ‘agency	   of	   the	   nation-­‐‑state’	   as	   part	   of	   hegemonic	   national	   music	  practices.	  Using	  New	  Zealand	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this,	  he	  notes	  that	  ‘interventions	  may	  be	  cultural	   in	   aspiration,	   or	   they	   may	   be	   motivated	   primarily	   by	   national	   industrial	  concerns.	  In	  either	  case,	  notions	  of	  national	  music	  or	  musics	  are	  perpetuated’	  (O’Flynn	  2007,	  28).	  Despite	  this,	  O’Flynn	  ultimately	  argues	  for	  a	  more	  fluid	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relationship	   between	   the	   nation-­‐‑state,	   civil	   society,	   local	   and	   international	   economic	  institutions	   and	   global	   and	   local	   culture.	   This	   means	   that	   ‘the	   nation	   presents	   an	  appropriate	   focus	   for	   studies	   of	   music	   and	   collective	   identity’	   while	   theories	   of	  ‘transitional	  authenticities’	  present	  a	  way	  to	  include	  the	  ‘interplay	  between	  national	  and	  global	  contexts	  of	  musical	  identification’	  (37).	  	  
Popular music and radio in New Zealand Andrew	  Dubber	   (2007)	  has	   interrogated	   the	  nature	  of	  New	  Zealand	  popular	  music	   as	  both	   cultural	   and	   economic	   endeavour,	   arguing	   that	   the	   New	   Zealand	   government,	  through	   legislation	   enabling	   the	   deregulation	   of	   radio	   ownership	   and	   content	   in	  combination	   with	   legislation	   that	   required	   the	   funding	   agency	   New	   Zealand	   on	   Air	  (NZOA)1	   to	   get	   as	  much	   New	   Zealand	  music	   on	   the	   radio	   as	   possible,	   had	   effectively	  weighted	  the	  economic	  potential	  of	  popular	  music	  over	  the	  national	  cultural	  benefits	  of	  music	  made	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  As	  Dubber	  observes,	  the	  ‘forces	  of	  free	  market	  economies’	  had	   ‘a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   cultural	   life’	   (22)	   of	   New	   Zealanders	   and	   had	   driven	  NZOA	  to	  fulfil	  its	  legal	  obligations	  by	  funding	  only	  New	  Zealand	  music	  that	  would	  fit	  with	  imported	  popular	  music	  (25-­‐‑26).	  Noting	  that	  ‘recorded	  popular	  music	  is	  largely	  without	  geographical	   focus’,	   Dubber	   also	   argues	   that	   the	   New	   Zealand	   music	   environment	   is	  balanced	   between	   the	   local	   and	   the	   global,	   and	   that	   these	   positions	   are	   in	   constant	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that	  New	  Zealand	   radio	   is	   the	   sum	  of	   local	   and	   international	   influences,	   technological	  progress,	   the	   ‘commercial	   imperative’,	   government	   intervention	   in	   supporting	   New	  Zealand	  music	  and	  the	  deregulated	  structure	  in	  which	  it	  operates	  (120-­‐‑59).	  This	  creates	  a	   ‘hybrid’	   form	  of	   radio	   that	   is	  unique	   to	  New	  Zealand,	  but	  also	   risk-­‐‑averse,	   lacking	   in	  innovation	   and	   overwhelmingly	   dominated	   by	   music	   from	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	  United	   Kingdom	   (178-­‐‑88).	   Additionally,	   Reilly	   claims	   that	   the	   overall	   effect	   of	  deregulation	  and	  the	  conglomeration	  of	  ownership	   that	   it	  allows	   in	  New	  Zealand	  have	  created	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  radio	  that	  is	  not	  serving	  the	  needs	  of	  local	  audiences.	  Consolidation,	   by	   nature,	   is	   a	   centralising,	   homogenising	   agent	   that	   must	  achieve	  economic	  efficiency	  by	  swallowing	  up	  individual	  station	  cultures	  that	  in	   the	   past	   have	   served	   as	   local	   laboratories	   for	   new	   ideas	   and	   emerging	  talent	  (17).	  Reilly	   also	   argues	   that	   interrogating	   the	   hybrid	   nature	   of	   New	   Zealand	   radio—influenced	   heavily	   by	   Anglo-­‐‑American	   music	   as	   well	   as	   by	   the	   government	   through	  funding	   and	  programming	   and	   also	   through	   radio	  workers	  practising	   in	   such	   a	  highly	  commercial	   environment—allows	   an	   unpacking	   of	   power	   relations	   between	   global	  forces,	  broadcasters,	  governments	  and	  audiences	  (297-­‐‑301).	  In	  this	  sense,	  Reilly	  echoes	  and	   expands	   on	   Jeremy	   Tunstall’s	   earlier	   critiques	   of	   cultural	   imperialist’s	   claims	   of	  national	   cultures	   being	   ‘battered	   out	   of	   existence’	   by	   ‘low,	   brutal	   and	   commercial’	  foreign	  media	  products,	  mainly	  from	  the	  United	  States	  (Tunstall	  1977,	  580-­‐‑81).	  Tunstall	  argues	   that	   a	   broader	   and	  more	   nuanced	   view	   of	   the	   intersection	   of	   cultures	   and	   the	  formation	   of	   hybrid	   responses	   allows	   for	   a	   detailed	   examination	   of	   the	   influence	   of	  outside	  media	   products	   on	   national	   cultures	   and	   their	   cultural	   outputs	   (85).	   Tunstall	  believes	   in	   a	   form	   of	   media	   imperialism	   that	   is	   an	   extension	   of	   British	   imperialism,	  resonating	   through	   American	   and	   wider	   Western	   culture.	   Reilly	   sees	   the	   foreign	  influence	  on	  music	   radio	  as	  part	  of	   the	  wider	  hybrid	  nature	  of	  musical	   culture,	  where	  musical	  forms	  are	  captured,	  adapted	  and	  transformed	  by	  local	  participants	  in	  the	  global	  culture,	   which	   is	   in	   itself	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   Anglo-­‐‑American	   culture	   (Reilly	   2011,	  297-­‐‑305).	  	  	  Reilly	  refers	   to	  a	  process	  of	   ‘delocalisation’	  of	  both	  New	  Zealand	  music	  radio	  and	  New	  Zealand	   music	   as	   it	   mimics	   popular	   international	   forms	   that	   dominate	   radio	  programming	  and	  also	  attract	  funding	  from	  NZOA	  (2011,	  300).	  Reilly	  also	  interrogates	  the	  roles	  of	  programme	  directors	  and	  national	  ‘talent	  trainers’	  (who	  train	  on-­‐‑air	  staff)	  in	  the	  big	  commercial	  radio	  companies,	  as	  they	  are	  the	  most	  critical	  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day	  influencers	  of	   music	   radio	   outputs.	   These	   influencers	   are	   influenced	   themselves	   by	   the	   Anglo-­‐‑American	  music	   business,	   the	   Anglo-­‐‑American	   owners	   of	   their	   companies	   and	   by	   the	  Anglo-­‐‑American	   radio	   industry	   that	   they	   have	   contact	   with	   through	   international	  conferences	  and	  relationships	  (293-­‐‑96).	  	  	  Reilly	  acknowledges	  that	  ‘the	  notion	  of	  hybridity	  provides	  an	  alternative,	  but	  ultimately	  it	   is	   an	   incomplete	   understanding	   of	   transcultural	   formation’	   as	   it	   is	   ‘cultural	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imperialism	  with	  caveats’	  (2011,	  299),	  and	  instead	  describes	  the	  recent	  developments	  in	  New	  Zealand	  music	  radio	  as	  a	  ‘complex	  mixture	  of	  the	  local	  and	  the	  global	  that	  could	  not	  be	   explained	   by	   simplistic	   notions	   of	   hybridity’	   (8).	   Reilly	   ultimately	   argues	   for	   New	  Zealand	  music	  radio	  as	  a	  place	  where	  new	  forms	  of	  music	  unique	   to	  New	  Zealand	  can	  and	  should	  be	  nurtured	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  project	   to	  roll	  back	  homogenisation,	   ‘global	  impersonation’	  and	  conservatism	  as	  part	  of	  claiming	  a	  unique	  ‘New	  Zealand-­‐‑ness’	  on	  the	  airwaves	   that	   supports	   a	  wider	   and	  more	   vibrant	   local	   culture.	   For	   Reilly,	   that	  might	  negate	  the	  most	  pernicious	  effects	  of	   imitation,	  homogenisation	  and	  commercialisation	  that	   the	   Anglo-­‐‑American	   influence	   has	   on	   New	   Zealand’s	   musical	   culture	   (293-­‐‑304).	  These	  arguments	  somewhat	  support	   the	  existence	  of	  a	   radio	  station	   like	  Kiwi	  FM	  as	  a	  cultural	   endeavour	   and	   also	   as	   a	   bulwark	   against	   the	   constant	   encroachment	   of	  international	   influences.	  However,	  Kiwi	  FM	  was	  able	  to	  garner	  government	  support	  by	  appealing	  to	  larger	  Labour	  objectives	  concerning	  the	  creative	  economy	  of	  New	  Zealand.	  	  





truck	   .	   .	   .	   we	   saw	   an	   opportunity	   to	   utilize	   93.8	   for	   something	   else	   and	  secondly	   to	   move	   Kiwi	   to	   those	   frequencies	   where	   we	   gained	   another	  commercial	   advantage,	   namely	   that	   we	   wouldn’t	   have	   to	   pay	   for	   the	  frequency.	  .	  .	  .	  So	  it	  made	  commercial	  sense	  for	  us	  because	  we	  could	  come	  up	  with	  a	  viable	  option	  but	  also	  we	  could	  release	  those	  frequencies	  for	  the	  Edge	  (Impey	  2012).	  From	  this	  point	  on,	  Kiwi	  FM	  could	  only	  exist	  if	  it	  was	  given	  frequencies	  and	  some	  kind	  of	  public	  or	  government	  financial	  support	  otherwise	  it	  was	  not	  commercially	  viable.	  Impey	  puts	   that	   in	   perspective:	   ‘the	   revenue	   targets	  were	   $40,000	   a	  month,	   so	  we’re	   talking	  less	  than	  half	  a	  million	  bucks’	  (a	  year)	  and	  that	   ‘Kiwi	  never	  made	  a	  profit’.	  Further,	  he	  disclosed	   that	   ‘it	   probably	   lost	   between	   fifty	   and	   a	   hundred	   grand	   every	   year’,	   an	  unsustainable	   situation	   for	   any	   commercial	   enterprise	   (Impey	   2012).	   Without	  government	   support	   it	   is	   very	   likely	   the	   network	   would	   have	   disappeared	   from	   the	  airwaves.	  	  
Initial approaches to Government: A bold plan In	   December	   2005,	   the	   first	   attempt	   began	   to	   engage	   the	   Government	   in	   order	   to	  preserve	   the	   network.	   This	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	   get	   free	   frequencies	   and	   ‘direct	  government	  funding’.	  Crucially,	  this	  was	  less	  than	  a	  year	  into	  the	  Kiwi	  FM	  ‘experiment’.	  The	  CanWest	  proposal:	  ‘A	  New	  Model	  for	  Kiwi	  FM	  100%	  New	  Zealand	  Music’	  begins	  by	  presenting	  the	  stations	  financial	  position,	  acknowledging	  a	  small	  loss,4	  then	  attempts	  to	  convince	   The	   Labour	   Government’s	  Minister	   for	   Broadcasting,	   Steve	  Maharey,5	   to	   use	  taxpayer	   funding—‘akin	   to	   the	  New	  Zealand	  on	  Air	   funding	   for	   local	   programming	  on	  television’—to	  provide	  ‘capital	  grants’	  for	  transmission	  costs	  for	  an	  extension	  from	  the	  three	  metro	  markets	  into	  thirteen	  markets	  nationwide,	  studio	  costs	  and	  building	  costs,	  as	  well	  as	  ‘on-­‐‑going	  operating	  grants	  from	  New	  Zealand	  on	  Air	  .	  .	  .	  to	  produce	  77.5	  hours	  of	   specialist	   programming	   per	   week’	   which	   would	   be	   ‘supplemented	   by	   advertising	  revenue’	  (CanWest	  2005,	  5).	  	  	  	  This	  request	   for	  unprecedented	  direct	   funding	  of	  commercial	  broadcasting	  operations,	  including	  paying	   for	  plant	  and	  ground	  rent	  comes	  after	  going	  through	  and	  discounting	  four	  options	  for	  Kiwi	  FM—the	  commercial	  model,	  becoming	  part	  of	  radio	  New	  Zealand,	  selling	   it	   into	   a	   trust	   to	   operate	   as	   a	   not	   for	   profit	   and	   closing	   it	   down.	   CanWest	  ultimately	   argues	   that	   funding	   Kiwi	   FM	   directly	   would	   fulfil	   NZOA’s	   stated	   goals	   of	  getting	  more	  New	  Zealand	  music	  on	  the	  radio	  and	  to	  ‘exploit	  opportunities	  to	  promote	  diversity	   in	   New	   Zealand	   music	   so	   that	   those	   making	   music	   outside	   the	   commercial	  mainstream	  are	  also	  heard’	   (CanWest	  2005,	  4).	   In	  addition,	   this	  proposal	   is	   explicit	   in	  requesting	   the	   YRN	   frequencies,	   saying	   ‘the	   government	   could	   assign	   the	   national	  frequency	   reserved	   for	   Youth	   Radio	   Network	   for	   a	   term	   of,	   say,	   three	   to	   five	   years,	  whereupon	  the	  agreement	  could	  be	  reviewed’	  (5).	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CanWest	  had	  understood	  the	  political	  environment	  well,	  pinpointing	  a	  particular	  policy	  conundrum	   the	   Minister	   was	   grappling	   with	   that	   could	   be	   exploited	   for	   CanWest’s	  benefit,	   if	   handled	   carefully.	   CEO	   of	   CanWest	   at	   the	   time	   Brent	   Impey	   sees	   this	   has	  essential	  to	  the	  way	  business	  is	  done	  in	  New	  Zealand	  in	  that:	  If	  there	  is	  a	  government	  policy	  objective	  in	  this	  area,	  in	  the	  area	  of	  music,	  to	  promote	  New	  Zealand	  music,	  we’re	  gonna	  do	  it	  (Impey	  2013).	  In	   order	   to	   effectively	   engage	  with	   government	   then,	   Impey	   argues	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  elevate	  discussions	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  decision	  chain,	  avoiding	  bureaucrats	  and	  if	  possible,	  using	  the	  power	  status	  of	  the	  particular	  industry	  that	  stands	  to	  benefit	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  access	  and	  influence:	  Lobbying	  was	  really	  done	  essentially	  at	  Government	  Minister	   level.	   	  There’s never	   really	   been	   a	   broadcasting	   department	   so	   going	   through	   officials	   is	  generally	  of	  more	  limited	  success	  in	  this	  area.	  	  Also,	  because	  politicians	  are	  so	  media-­‐‑savvy,	   you	   can	   get	   a	   better	   result	   if	   you	   go	   and	   see	   them	   instead	  of,	  say,	   if	   you	  were	   running,	   I	   don't	   know,	   the	  waste	   industry.	   .	   .	   .	   This	   is	  New	  Zealand,	  it’s	  not	  just	  broadcasting,	  it	  helps	  everywhere	  (Impey	  2012).	  
 
Engaging the government: A new plan CanWest	   refined	   their	   strategy	  after	   the	   initial	  attempt	   to	  secure	  new	   frequencies	  and	  bulk	  funding	  for	  Kiwi	  FM	  failed.	  After	  Steve	  Maharey	  had	  referred	  the	  Kiwi	  FM	  proposal	  to	  Murray	   Costello,	   Acting	   Chief	   of	   the	  Ministry	   for	   Culture	   and	  Heritage7	   (MCH),	   the	  MCH	   contacted	   Karyn	   Hay	   to	   discuss	   it	   further	   (Costello,	   2006).	   Key	   points	   in	   the	  conversation	  included	  a	  promise	  that	  a	  Kiwi	  FM	  on	  free	  spectrum	  ‘reserved	  for	  the	  YRN’	  would	  be	  operated	  by	  CanWest,	  operating	  costs	  would	  be	  reduced	  and	  the	  ‘77.5	  hours	  a	  week	  of	  specialist	  shows’	  could	  be	  funded	  by	  a	  NZOA	  grant	  of	  $240,000,	  allowing	  Kiwi	  FM	   to	   ‘balance	   out	   .	   .	   .	   an	   extremely	   tight	   budget’	  with	   advertising	   to	   see	   if	   ‘Kiwi	   can	  stand	   on	   its	   own	   two	   feet’	   (Hay	   2006a).	   Further	   discussions	   happened	   throughout	  January	  and	  February	  with	  both	  Costello	  and	  Steve	  Maharey’s	  advisor	  on	  broadcasting,	  Philippa	  Bowron,	  who	  appears	  for	  the	  first	  time	  as	  copied	  into	  three	  discussions	  about	  the	  development	  of	  a	  proposal	  to	  Maharey	  on	  25	  and	  27	  of	  February	  (Hay,	  2006b,	  2006c,	  2006d).	  Bowron	  plays	  quite	  a	  significant	  role	  as	   the	  Kiwi	  FM	  story	  develops	   from	  this	  point	  on.	  
 
Selling the vision: Getting the bureaucrats onside Karen	  Hay	  engaged	  the	  help	  of	  MCH’s	  Murray	  Costello	  and	  Philippa	  Bowron	  in	  an	  email	  to	   them	   both	   with	   a	   ‘few	   points	   for	   your	   consideration	   to	   present	   to	   the	  Minister	   of	  Broadcasting’	   (Hay	   2006c).	   The	   letter	   refers	   to	   their	   earlier	   discussions	   and	   then	  outlines	  reasons	  to	  support	  an	  application	  for	  a	  one-­‐‑year	  free	  licence	  to	  broadcast	  on	  the	  youth	   radio	   network	   assigned	   frequencies,	   claiming	   that	   the	  Kiwi	   FM	   request	  was	   ‘an	  entirely	  unique	  proposition	  .	  .	  .	  not	  a	  substitute	  for	  any	  proposed	  Youth	  Radio	  Network’	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the	   government.	   As	   I	   will	   show,	   the	   points	   and	   issues	   raised	   by	   Hay	   are	   later	  incorporated	  into	  the	  discussions	  about	  Kiwi	  FM	  throughout	  this	  period.	  	  
Connecting with the ‘third way’ agenda After	   refining	   the	   earlier	  official	   proposals	   to	   include	   ‘background’	   and	   information	   to	  ‘encapsulate	  where	  we	  are	  now’	  (Hay	  2006d),	  CanWest	  presented	  another	  partnership	  proposal	   in	   a	  document	   titled	   ‘Short-­‐‑term	  Frequency	  Application	   for	  KIWI	  100%	  New	  Zealand	  Music’	   to	   the	  Ministry	   for	   Culture	   and	  Heritage	   and	   Steve	  Maharey	   in	  March	  2006	   (CanWest	   2006).	   The	   document	   begins	  with	   an	   appeal	   to	   consider	   the	   proposal	  alongside	  some	  of	  the	  major	  international	  achievements	  of	  New	  Zealand	  sports	  and	  also	  the	  New	  Zealand	  film	  industry,	  hugely	  celebrated	   in	  New	  Zealand	  at	   the	  time	  after	   the	  success	  of	  the	  ‘Lord	  of	  the	  Rings’	  trilogy	  which	  was	  directed	  by	  a	  New	  Zealander	  (Peter	  Jackson)	   who	   also	   shot	   most	   of	   the	   scenes	   in	   New	   Zealand.	   Controversially,	   the	  government	   had	   given	   very	   favourable	   tax	   breaks	   to	   the	   Hollywood	   studio	   (Warner	  Brothers)	  that	  produced	  the	  trilogy	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  the	  films	  and	  the	  attendant	  jobs	  and	  publicity	   for	   ‘brand	  New	  Zealand’	   that	  would	   come	   from	   them.	  Labour	   laws	  were	  also	   changed	   to	   make	   it	   easier	   and	   cheaper	   to	   control	   the	   local	   workforce	   on	   the	  productions	  (Bennett	  and	  Donnell	  2010;	  Brooks	  2010).	  This	  situation	  was	  widely	  known	  throughout	   the	   media	   industries,	   and	   is	   noted	   in	   the	   proposal	   also,	   perhaps	   as	   a	  reminder	   that	   government	   intervention	   in	   the	   creative	   sector	   was	   not	   new	   and	   had	  benefits.	  The	  proposal	  is	  a	  very	  deliberate	  attempt	  to	  position	  Kiwi	  FM	  in	  the	  company	  of	  celebrated	  national	  achievers	  and	  begins:	  Over	   the	   last	   decade	   the	   government	   has	   worked	   tirelessly	   with	   the	   New	  Zealand	   music	   community	   in	   a	   bid	   to	   take	   our	   music	   to	   the	   world.	   The	  potential	  benefits	  for	  the	  nation	  are	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  a	  World	  Cup	  rugby	  bid,	  an	   Americas	   Cup	   campaign,	   or	   a	   major	   motion	   picture	   production;	   and	  they’re	  not	  only	   financial—they	   reach	   to	   the	  heart	  of	  our	   culture	   (CanWest	  2006,	  2).	  The	  proposal	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  Kiwi	  FM	  is	  a	   ‘legitimate	  and	  important’	  part	  of	   the	  potential	   internationalization	   of	   New	   Zealand	   music	   as	   a	   ‘focal	   point	   for	   the	  international	  and	  ex-­‐‑patriot	  community’	  as	  well	  as	  claiming	  that	  ‘we	  need	  access	  to	  the	  ears	   of	   the	   nation’	   to	   create	   hit	   songs,	   ‘fostering	   our	   national	   identity	   and	   creating	  residual	   income	   for	   New	   Zealanders	   (not	   just	   the	   pockets	   of	   the	   existing	   musical	  superpowers)’	  (CanWest	  2005).	  Here	  are	  examples	  of	  O’Flynn’s	  conception	  of	  ‘cultural’	  and	  ‘industrial’	  governmental	  interventions	  in	  promoting	  a	  national	  music	  culture	  being	  invoked	  in	  support	  of	  Kiwi	  FM.	  	  These	  are	  appeals	  to	  the	  platforms	  of	  the	  Labour	  government’s	  policy	  agenda	  for	  New	  Zealand	   music	   at	   the	   time,	   presenting	   a	   ‘third-­‐‑way’	   vision	   of	   economic,	   cultural	   and	  national	   benefits	   of	   supporting	   Kiwi	   FM.	   Further,	   the	   proposal	   goes	   on	   to	   argue	   that	  Kiwi	  FM	  was	   instrumental	   in	   lifting	   the	  amount	  of	  New	  Zealand	  music	  played	  on	  New	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Zealand	  radio	  over	   the	  20	  per	  cent	   target	   for	   the	  voluntary	  quota	  (from	  just	  under	  19	  per	   cent	   to	   20.6	   per	   cent),	   which	   represented	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   new	   and	  commercially	   risky	   artists	   who	   could	   not	   compete	   for	   playlist	   spots	   on	   ‘regular	  commercial	   stations’	   with	   their	   focus	   on	   ‘name	   artists’	   (CanWest	   2005,	   4).	   This	  ‘opportunity	  for	  exposure’	  (CanWest	  2005)	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  later	  decisions	  around	  Kiwi	  FM	   as	   key	   factor	   in	   policy	   maker’s	   thinking,	   with	   one	   briefing	   paper	   noting	   that	  ‘diversity’	  was	  a	  key	  reason	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  applauded	  the	  establishment	  of	  Kiwi	  FM	  in	   2005	   (Costello,	  Murray	   and	  Maharey	   2006,	   4),	   and	   another	   highlighting	   CanWest’s	  promise	   to	  diversify	   the	  music	   and	  develop	   specialist	   programming	   in	   return	   for	   free	  frequencies	  (Daniels	  2006).	  	  





Chunn	  was	  also	  a	  host	  on	  Kiwi	  FM,	  showcasing	  the	  outputs	  of	   the	  Trust	   in	  a	  half-­‐‑hour	  weekly	   show.	   Chunn	   claims	   that	   ‘the	   radio	   broadcast	   of	   a	   song	   written	   by	   a	   school	  student	   is	  nothing	  less	  than	  profound	   .	   .	   .	  bringing	  secondary	  school	  students	  from	  Ak,	  Wgtn	  and	  Chch9	  to	  their	  radios’	  (Chunn	  2012).	  Somewhat	  obliquely	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  document,	  Chunn	  goes	  on	  to	  point	  out	  that	  out	  of	  315	  songs	  entered	  into	  an	  annual	  Play	  It	  Strange	  song	  writing	  contest,	  71	  per	  cent	  came	  from	  outside	  the	  three	  cities	  Kiwi	  FM	  broadcasts	   in,	   saying	   it	   was	   a	   ‘national	  movement’,	   but	   hardly	  making	   a	   case	   for	   the	  success	  of	  Kiwi	  FM	  up	  until	  that	  point	  in	  time	  (Chunn	  2012).	  	  	  Chunn	   very	   much	   brings	   a	   ‘cool’	   factor	   to	   the	   proposal	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	   Labour	  government	  was	   attempting	   to	   align	   itself	  with	   a	   section	  of	   the	   cultural	   economy	  and	  attract	   and	   maintain	   younger	   voters,	   again	   echoing	   ‘Cool	   Britannia’	   and	   Tony	   Blair’s	  attempts	  to	  integrate	  his	  government’s	  image	  with	  icons	  of	  British	  popular	  culture	  such	  as	  Noel	  Gallagher	  of	  the	  band	  Oasis.10	  	  Another	   letter	   is	   from	  Brendan	  Smyth,	  Music	  Manager	   for	  NZOA.11	  Noting	   that	  NZOA	  were	   following	   the	   proposal	   as	   ‘Karen	   Hay	   and	   Brent	   Impey	   have	   kept	   us	   informed	  throughout’.	  Smyth	  gives	  strong	  support	  to	  the	  proposal	  as	  he	  argues	  that	   ‘Kiwi’s	  time	  had	  come’.	  He	  argues	  that	  after	  ten	  years	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  voluntary	  quota	  and	  NZOA	  intervention	   in	  the	  music	  and	  broadcasting	  markets	  and	  in	  raising	  the	  amount	  of	  New	  Zealand	  made	  music	  played	  on	  the	  radio,	   ‘we	  can	  “afford’’	  a	  100%	  New	  Zealand	  music	  station’	   as	   there	   was	   no	   longer	   the	   danger	   of	   it	   being	   used	   as	   the	   ‘excuse	   that	  mainstream	   radio	   needed	   to	   continue	   to	   ignore	   local	  music’	   (Smyth	  2007).	   The	   letter	  also	  talks	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  up	  to	  $250,000	  a	  year	  being	  available	  to	  Kiwi	  FM	  through	  NZOA	   contestable	   grants,	   from	   a	   pool	   of	   $450,000	   already	   accessed	   by	   student	  commercial	   radio	   (Smyth	   2007).	   The	   letter	   finishes	   with	   ‘we	   hope	   the	   proposal	   put	  forward	  by	  CanWest	  and	  Karen	  Hay	  to	  maintain	  the	  station	  under	  the	  CanWest	  umbrella	  can	   be	   given	   a	   chance	   to	  work’	   (Smyth	  2007).	   This	   letter	   obviously	   carried	  weight	   in	  discussions	  about	  the	  proposal	  at	  governmental	   levels,	  with	  sections	  of	  the	  letter	  used	  verbatim	   in	   Ministry	   for	   Culture	   and	   Heritage	   policy	   recommendations,	   Ministerial	  briefings	  and	  Cabinet	  discussion	  papers.12	  The	  verbatim	  use	  of	  this	  material	  across	  these	  papers	  and	  briefings	  made	  it	  very	  influential	  on	  the	  process,	  meaning	  the	  CanWest/Kiwi	  FM	  position	  supported	  by	  Smyth	  took	  on	  official	  imprimatur,	  greatly	  enhancing	  the	  case	  for	  Kiwi	  FM	  to	  receive	  government	  support.	  This	  material	  was	  taken	  unattributed	  and	  out	   of	   context	   and	   its	   use	   across	  different	   official	   forums	   further	  de-­‐‑contextualized	   it,	  making	   it	   an	   ‘official’	   position,	   rather	   than	   just	   a	   strong	   note	   of	   support	   from	   an	  individual	  bureaucrat.	  	  In	   a	   December	   2012	   interview,	   I	   asked	   Smyth	   about	   this	   letter,	   as	   it	   seemed	  extraordinary	  to	  ask	  someone	  in	  his	  position	  to	  support	  one	  commercial	  organization	  in	  obtaining	   potential	   market	   advantages	   over	   its	   rivals	   with	   free	   frequencies.	   Smyth	  expressed	  a	  small	  modicum	  of	  regret,	  saying	  that	  ‘perhaps	  I	  shouldn’t	  of	  written	  it’,	  but	  did	  not	  elaborate	  further	  on	  why	  he	  now	  felt	  it	  may	  have	  been	  a	  mistake	  (Smyth	  2012).	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During	  further	  discussion,	  it	  did	  seem	  that	  on	  reflection	  Smyth	  was	  wary	  of	  been	  seen	  as	  privileging	   CanWest,	   especially	   as	   the	   student	   radio	   stations	   had	   been	   vocally	  disappointed	  in	  NZOA	  and	  the	  government	  over	  the	  funding	  and	  support	  of	  Kiwi	  FM.	  	  So,	  despite	  some	  misgivings,	  Smyth	  reiterated	   that	   ‘Kiwi	  FM’s	   time	  had	  come’	   in	  2006	  and	   that	   he	  was	   happy	   to	   support	   it	   as	   it	   gave	  NZOA	   another	   outlet	   to	   help	  meet	   its	  statutory	  and	  strategic	  goals	  of	  ‘getting	  more	  New	  Zealand	  music	  on	  New	  Zealand	  radio’,	  which	  was	  a	  key	  policy	  directive	  in	  the	  legislation	  that	  governed	  his	  work	  (Smyth	  2012).	  When	   asked	   about	   his	   evaluation	   of	   Karen	   Hay’s	   role	   in	   the	   Kiwi	   FM	   story,	   Smyth	  showed	  real	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  part	  she	  played	  in	  ‘saving’	  Kiwi	  FM,	  stating	  that	  she	  was	  a	   passionate	   and	   driven	   advocate	   for	  New	  Zealand	  music	   and	   that	   ‘people	   like	  Karyn	  change	  the	  world’	  (Smyth	  2012).	  Smyth	  related	  their	  long	  friendship	  and	  reiterated	  that	  he	  felt	  Hay	  was	  critical	  to	  keeping	  Kiwi	  FM	  on	  air	  (Smyth	  2012).	  Without	  overstating	  the	  case,	   there	   is	   perhaps	   a	   question	   of	   professional	   distance	   here,	   although	   Smyth’s	  assertion	   that	   Kiwi	   FM’s	   ‘time	   had	   come’	   backs	   up	   his	   strong	   opinion	   in	   the	   letter	   of	  support	  he	  supplied	  to	  the	  original	  CanWest	  proposal.	  (Smyth	  2007).	  	  





recommendations	  for	  government.	  One	  particularly	  influential	  position	  paper	  remains	  a	  key	   source	   of	   policy	   advice	   today.	   Published	   in	  March	   2006,	   Dieter	   Katz’s	   ‘Financing	  Infrastructure	   Projects:	   Public	   Private	   Partnerships’	   acknowledges	   that	   ‘there	   is	   little	  reliable	   empirical	   evidence	   about	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   PPPs’,	   but	   makes	   a	  ‘qualitative	   assessment’	   that	   ‘a	   PPP	  may	   be	   a	   good	  way	   of	   procuring	   services	   only	   if	  three	   conditions	   are	   met:	   Project	   outcomes	   can	   be	   specified	   in	   service	   level	   terms,	  performance	   can	   be	   measured	   objectively	   and	   performance	   objectives	   are	   durable’	  (Katz	  2006).	   In	   these	  terms,	   it	  seems	  a	  PPP	  with	  CanWest	   in	  Kiwi	  FM	  would	  not	  meet	  Katz’s	  conditions	  required	  for	  success	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  service	  level	  would	  be	  set,	  how	  performance	  would	  be	  objectively	  measured	  and	  how	  durable	   the	  performance	  of	   the	  network	   would	   be.	   Although	   the	   underlying	   ideology	   of	   the	   deal	   reflected	   the	   PPP	  model,	  to	  name	  it	  that	  would	  have	  given	  the	  deal	  undeserved	  gravitas	  and	  stature	  and	  perhaps	  intertwined	  the	  government	  and	  Kiwi	  FM	  (and	  also	  conceivably,	  CanWest)	  too	  tightly,	  opening	  the	  government	  up	  to	  accusations	  of	  favourable	  treatment	  of	  one	  half	  of	  the	  international	  media	  duopoly	  operating	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  Despite	  this,	  the	  deal	  went	  ahead.	  	  
Criticism of the deal: Managing reactions and minimizing bad press  Despite	   the	  positive	  and	  supportive	  spin	  put	  on	   the	  announcement,	   there	  was	  notable	  criticism	   of	   the	   deal	   almost	   immediately,	  with	   one	  well	   documented	   example	   coming	  from	  a	  New	  Zealand	  music	  icon—Neill	  Finn	  of	  the	  internationally	  successful	  bands	  Split	  Enz	  and	  Crowded	  House.	   	  Senior	  Ministry	  for	  Culture	  and	  Heritage	  Policy	  Advisor	  Rick	  Julian	  was	   instrumental	   in	   preventing	   this	   criticism	   from	  overwhelming	   the	   feel-­‐‑good	  factor	   of	   the	   Kiwi	   FM	   support	   deal	   for	   the	   government	   with	   advice	   to	   MCH	   and	  broadcasting	   policy	   makers	   about	   negative	   publicity	   from	   Finn,	   a	   vocal	   critic	   and	  determined	  supporter	  of	  a	  youth	  radio	  network	  of	  eight	  years.	  	  	  Finn	  wrote	   a	   strongly	  worded	   email	   titled	   simply	   ‘Why?’	   to	   Steve	  Maharey	   on	   2	  May	  2006,	  the	  day	  after	  the	  announcement,	  claiming	  that	   ‘I	  am	  sure	  you	  are	  going	  to	  enjoy	  and	  even	  sweeter	  relationship	  with	  CanWest’,	  that	  a	  chance	  to	  give	  ‘young	  people	  a	  real	  voice’	   had	   been	   ‘squandered	   .	   .	   .	   adding	   insult	   to	   injury’	   and	   that	   Kiwi	   FM	   was	   an	  ‘embarrassing	  indulgence’,	  spending	  public	  money	  on	  a	  ‘failed	  enterprise,	  encouraging	  it	  to	   make	   even	   more	   obscure	   programming’	   that	   could	   not	   be	   good	   for	   New	   Zealand	  music’	   (Finn	   2006).	   Further,	   Finn	   went	   on	   to	   single	   out	   Brent	   Impey	   as	   ‘an	   ego,	   a	  hypocrite’	   who	   had	   lambasted	   the	   youth	   radio	   network	   but	   was	   ‘indeed	   a	   skilful	  manipulator’	   and	   that	   ‘it	   disgusts	  me	   that	  he	  now	  enjoys	   the	   frequencies	   and	   funding	  that	  should	  have	  belonged	  to	  young	  people’s	  public	  radio’	  (Finn	  2006).	  	  	  This	  intensely	  personal	  attack	  on	  Impey	  is,	  in	  my	  view,	  unjustified	  and	  perhaps	  did	  not	  help	  make	  Finn’s	  case	  or	  present	  him	  as	  a	  passionate	  but	  thoughtful	  advocate	  of	  public	  broadcasting.	   Finn’s	   status	   as	   a	  musical	   icon	   in	  New	  Zealand	  who	  had	   ‘conquered	   the	  world’	  with	  the	  Split	  Enz	  and	  Crowded	  House	  lent	  him	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  cultural	  cache	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Julian’s	  advice	  to	  Bowron,	  sent	  at	  12.01pm,	  again	  summarizes	  the	  public	  position	  of	  both	  the	  government	  and	  CanWest	  on	  Kiwi	  FM.	  Julian	  begins	  with:	  	  The	   key	   message	   of	   the	   response	   should	   be	   that	   the	   decision	   to	   grant	  CanWest	  temporary	  use	  of	  the	  frequencies	  has	  been	  made	  in	  support	  of	  the	  government’s	   New	   Zealand	   music	   initiatives.	   This	   should	   not	   be	   confused	  with	   support	   for	   a	   possible	   future	   youth	   radio	   network	   which	   is	   a	   quite	  different	  matter	  altogether	  (Julian	  2006).	  	  While	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  public	  pronouncements	  about	  the	  Kiwi	  FM	  deal,	  it	  is	  more	  explicit	  in	  mentioning	  the	  lack	  of	  impact	  on	  a	  possible	  youth	  radio	  network,	  which	  was	  not	   mentioned	   at	   all	   in	   the	   1	   May	   2006	   press	   release	   from	   Trevor	   Mallard.	   This	   is	  presumably	  in	  order	  to	  placate	  Neil	  Finn,	  and	  informs	  critical	  parts	  of	  Marahey’s	  reply	  to	  Finn	  later	  that	  week	  (see	  below).	  	  	  Julian	   reiterates	   that	   the	   Kiwi	   FM	   proposal	   had	   support	   from	   ‘key	   music	   industry	  players,	   the	   NZ	   Music	   Industry	   Commission	   and	   NZ	   on	   Air,	   and	   by	   the	   government,	  because	  it	  is	  considered	  a	  worthwhile	  New	  Zealand	  music	  initiative’	  (Julian	  2006).	  This	  is	  despite	  a	  letter	  sent	  to	  MCH	  from	  Cath	  Andersen	  of	  the	  NZMIC,	  stating	  that	  they	  would	  not	  have	  supported	  Kiwi	  FM	  on	  public	   frequencies	  had	  they	  known	  that	  Hay’s	  request	  for	  support	  (which	  they	  gave	  in	  a	  letter	  earlier)	  was	  part	  of	  the	  proposal	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  nuance	  becomes	  more	  critical	  at	  this	  juncture	  as	  the	  NZMIC	  is	  being	  used	  to	  justify	  the	  decision	  in	  the	  face	  of	  strong	  and	  potentially	  damaging	  to	  the	  government	  criticism.	  It	  is	  an	  intriguing	  thought	  experiment	  to	  imagine	  what	  may	  have	  happened	  had	  the	  NZMIC	  publicly	   withdrawn	   its	   support	   and	   expressed	   its	   disappointment	   with	   being	  misrepresented	  at	  this	  point.	  	  	  The	   government	   and	   bureaucrats	   seemed	   anxious	   to	   downplay	   criticism	   of	   the	   deal	  quickly	   and	   concisely	   by	   using	   the	   support	   of	  music	   industry	   organizations	   to	   give	   a	  framework	  and	  significant	  gravitas	  to	  the	  policy.	  Perhaps	  a	  more	  strident	  reaction	  from	  NZMIC	  would	  have	  focused	  more	  media	  attention	  on	  the	  behind-­‐‑the-­‐‑scenes	  negotiations	  around	   Kiwi	   FM	   at	   this	   time.	   However,	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   this	   would	   have	   been	  unhelpful	  for	  NZMIC	  as	  a	  key	  player	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  music	  industries,	  in	  partnership	  with	  MCH	  and	  NZOA	  as	  well	  as	  the	  radio	  industry	  and	  also	  musicians	  who	  stood	  to	  get	  airplay	  on	  the	  network.	  A	  public	  disagreement	  with	  these	  parties	  may	  have	  been	  a	  step	  too	  far	  for	  Andersen	  and	  the	  NZMIC.	  	  	  Julian	  also	  reiterates	  that	  rather	  than	  ‘let	  the	  station	  disappear	  now’,	  Kiwi	  FM	  was	  being	  given	  ‘a	  year	  to	  restructure	  itself	  and	  secure	  alternative	  sources	  of	  funding	  .	  .	  .	  that	  will	  enable	  it	  to	  compete	  for	  possible	  future	  non-­‐‑commercial	  frequencies’	  and	  that	  Kiwi	  FM	  was	   to	  be	   ‘non-­‐‑commercial’	   and	  not-­‐‑for-­‐‑profit’	   (Julian	  2006).	  Finally,	   Julian	  states	   that	  the	  Kiwi	  FM	  frequencies	  ‘just	  happen	  to	  be	  frequencies	  reserved	  for	  other	  purposes’	  and	  that	  should	  the	  government	  require	  them	  ‘for	  purposes	  for	  which	  they	  were	  originally	  reserved’,	  Kiwi	  FM	  and	  other	  applicants	  ‘will	  be	  competing	  for	  frequencies	  elsewhere	  on	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Conclusion: Kiwi FM as a ‘third way’ experiment At	  this	  point	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  revisit	  the	  reflections	  of	  Brent	  Impey	  for	  clues	  as	  to	  how	  CanWest	   and	   its	   management	   acted	   during	   the	   developments	   traversed	   here.	   It	   is	  particularly	   informative	   to	   consider	   Impey’s	   conception	  of	   these	  processes.	  As	  CEO	  of	  CanWest,	   Impey	   had	   a	   stake	   in	   keeping	   Kiwi	   FM	   on-­‐‑air	   past	   the	   original	   one-­‐‑year	  frequency	   allocation,	   as	   it	   provided	   significant	  market	   advantages	   to	  MediaWorks.	   As	  Impey	  put	  it	  in	  2012:	  I'm	  a	  pragmatist	  so	   to	  me,	  all	   that	  academic	  debate	  about	  commercial,	  non-­‐‑commercial	   and	  public	   didn’t	  mean	  anything	   to	  me.	  To	  me	   it	  was	   all	   about	  getting	   the	  best	  possible	  result	   .	   .	   .	   I've	  read	  a	  whole	  bunch	  of	  stuff	  on	  Kiwi	  and	  none	  of	  its	  right	  because	  they	  miss	  the	  commercial	  aspect	  of	  it,	  why	  we	  did	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (Impey	  2013).	  	  	  This	  points	  to	  both	  a	  clash	  of	  cultures	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  ‘third-­‐‑way’	  attempts	  to	  reconcile	  the	  positions	  of	   the	  commercial	   sector	  and	  governments	   in	  providing	  services	   to	   fulfil	  particular	   government	   goals	   and	   aspirations.	   While	   Steve	   Maharey	   and	   others	   in	  government	   and	   the	   attendant	   bureaucracy	   had	   conceived	   of	   Kiwi	   FM	   as	   largely	   a	  service	  aiding	  government	  programmes	  in	  the	  sector,	  albeit	  being	  provided	  by	  a	  private	  company,	   Impey	   saw	   Kiwi	   FM	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   and	   ‘pragmatic’	   corporate	   strategy.	  These	   two	   conceptions,	  while	   not	  mutually	   exclusive,	   are	   not	   easily	   reconciled	   either.	  Ultimately	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  Kiwi	  FM,	  and	  its	  eventual	  10-­‐‑year	  tenure	  on	  the	  YRN	  frequencies	  was	   tied	   to	   the	   financial	   fortunes	   of	   CanWest	   and	   the	  willingness	   of	   two	  different	  governments	  to	  compromise	  on	  earlier	  principals	  and	  agreements	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	   being	   labeled	   as	   the	   government	   that	   ‘switched	  off’	   a	  New	  Zealand	  music	   radio	  service.	   This	   conundrum	   trapped	   the	   Labour	   and	   later	   National	   governments	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   the	   same	   tension	  over	   reclaiming	   the	  Kiwi	  FM	   frequencies	  was	  a	   factor	   in	  decision	   making	   about	   its	   tenure	   on	   the	   frequencies	   it	   was	   using	   until	   it	   voluntarily	  abandoned	  the	  Kiwi	  FM	  format	  in	  2015	  and	  returned	  the	  frequencies	  to	  the	  Crown.	  This	  was	  arguably	  instrumental	  in	  keeping	  Kiwi	  FM	  on-­‐‑air	  and	  also	  structured	  in	  a	  way	  that	  suited	  its	  parent	  company,	  despite	  its	  earlier	  not-­‐‑for-­‐‑profit	  and	  structural	  independence	  obligations.	  	  	  Kiwi	  FM	  was	  a	  win-­‐‑win	  situation	  for	  CanWest.	  If	  it	  proved	  to	  be	  successful	  at	  generating	  reasonable	  income	  by	  opening	  up	  new	  audiences	  for	  a	  New	  Zealand	  music	  service,	  it	  had	  worked.	  When	  it	  initially	  failed,	  moving	  the	  Edge	  into	  Auckland	  was	  a	  significant	  boost	  to	  CanWest’s	  revenue	  and	  having	  Kiwi	  FM	  on	  free	  frequencies	  was	  a	  strategic	  advantage	  over	   competitors	   as	   well	   as	   another	   potential	   revenue	   stream.	   By	   supporting	   the	  government’s	   programme	   for	   New	   Zealand	   music	   it	   was	   politically	   beneficial	   to	  CanWest	   in	   other	   ways	   too,	   perhaps	   facilitating	   better	   outcomes	   on	   other	   points	   of	  contention	   such	   as	   renewing	   spectrum	   leases	   on	   expiry	   in	   2011.13	   If	   it	   proved	   to	   be	  unsuccessful	   and	   was	   replaced	   by	   a	   more	   successful	   format,	   then	   dedicated	   New	  Zealand	   programming	   (and	   by	   association	   the	   YRN)	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   doomed	   to	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failure,	  strengthening	  the	  commercial	  radio	  sector’s	  argument	  that	  the	  YRN	  idea	  should	  be	   abandoned	   altogether.	   Kiwi	   FM	   also	   offered	   opportunities	   to	   secure	   funding	   from	  NZOA	  to	  make	  New	  Zealand	  programming.	  CanWest	  management	  made	  a	  prudent	  and	  appropriate	  business	  decision	  to	  develop	  and	  protect	  their	  market	  position	  by	  creating	  Kiwi	   FM	   and	   exploiting	   the	   potential	   opportunities	   it	   offered	   (Impey	   2013).	   But	  ultimately,	   and	   in	   a	  deeper	   sense,	   CanWest	  was	   able	   to	  define	  Kiwi	  FM	  as	  part	   of	   the	  Clark	   Labour	   government’s	   ‘third	  way’	   vision	   for	   the	   creative	   industries.	   By	   invoking	  and	   capitalizing	   on	   positivity	   around	   New	   Zealand	   music	   as	   a	   national,	   cultural	   and	  economic	   force	   in	   both	   public	   and	   governmental	   discourses,	   CanWest	   engaged	   with	  Labour	   government	   policy	   in	   order	   to	   pursue	   its	   own	   commercial	   strategies	   and	  enhance	  its	  revenue	  streams.	  
 





10.	  I	  use	  this	  example	  in	  reference	  to	  a	  famous	  photo	  that	  was	  published	  worldwide	  in	  1997	  of	  Blair	  and	  Gallagher	  sharing	  a	  joke	  at	  an	  official	  ‘Cool	  Britannia’	  function.	  Cathy	  Newman	  sums	  up	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  night	  in	  the	  Telegraph	  in	  2014:	  ‘The	  original	  Cool	  Britannia	  event	  fitted	  the	  moment.	  Here	  was	  an	  idealistic	  new	  PM	  overturning	  18	  years	  of	  Conservative	  rule,	  determined	  to	  show	  he	  was	  doing	  things	  differently.	  Inviting	  pop	  stars,	  actors	  and	  fashion	  designers	  into	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  establishment	  was	  a	  way	  of	  proving	  the	  traditional	  political	  mores	  were	  consigned	  to	  the	  fusty	  old	  history	  books’	  (Telegraph	  2014).	  11.	  Brendan	  Smyth	  was	  involved	  in	  designing	  and	  implementing	  government	  music	  strategies	  in	  New	  Zealand	  from	  1979	  until	  2015,	  first	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Arts	  Council	  for	  10	  years,	  then	  as	  Music	  Manager	  for	  The	  Broadcasting	  Commission,	  which	  later	  became	  NZOA.	  Smyth	  was	  awarded	  an	  MNZM	  (Member	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Order	  of	  Merit)	  in	  2011	  for	  Services	  to	  the	  Music	  Industry.	  Smyth	  is	  also	  on	  the	  Board	  of	  Trustees	  for	  Mike	  Chunn’s	  ‘Play	  it	  Strange	  Trust’	  (Play	  it	  Strange	  2016).	  	  12.	  One	  paragraph	  was	  widely	  used	  (and	  unattributed)	  in	  these	  documents:	  ‘The	  value	  of	  Kiwi	  in	  the	  current	  climate	  is	  that	  it	  can	  provide	  a	  “seedbed”	  for	  new	  New	  Zealand	  music	  and	  that	  it	  can	  champion	  diversity	  and	  eclecticism	  in	  New	  Zealand	  music	  in	  a	  way	  commercial	  radio	  cannot’	  (Smyth	  2006).	  	  13.	  CanWest	  negotiated	  a	  relatively	  cheap	  $40	  million	  20-­‐‑year	  lease	  from	  2011	  for	  the	  100s	  of	  frequencies	  it	  held	  at	  the	  time	  of	  relicensing.	  This	  compares	  to	  one	  CanWest	  spectrum	  lease	  purchase	  in	  Auckland	  in	  2009	  of	  $6.5	  million	  for	  20	  years	  (New	  
Zealand	  Herald	  2005).  
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